读前必看：
没看过的，建议先从前三篇看起。
这些资料多数来自于历史学者，冷兵器及兵击研究者D. A. Kinsley的著作，他从各种近代文献搜集了数千条英国剑士（顺带一点其他欧洲国家）在欧亚非各地的近身战斗记录。大光头Matt Easton高度认可他的著作，并为其作序，认为这些历史资料可以让我们更深入地理解兵击武术。
注意，时代不同，一个国家的武术氛围兴衰，士兵或者武者的战斗经验可能截然不同，不同的团体和个人也是一样。这些记录的来源也出自五花八门的文献资料，私人记录（当时欧洲人有普遍的日记习惯），当然，胜利者更容易留下记载，但重要的是我们可以一窥古人是如何看待战斗，武术和其他民族的战士，其参考性自行斟酌。
由于D. A. Kinsley搜集的记录多达数千条，所以我每次只能选小部分翻译，作为一个长期系列来做。这些记录收录在他的著作《大英帝国的剑士Swordsmen of the British Empire》《不列颠尼亚剑客Sword Fighter of Britinnia》中，至今他仍然在持续不断地搜集新的记录。
我会在有些条目下发表一些感想，这些感想建立在假设这些叙述属实的情况下。
奥斯曼土耳其骑兵
Maj. Gen. G. W. Freiherr von Valentini of the Prussian Army: “In earlier times, the sword and lance of the knight have proved formidable to the sabre of the Saracen; and even in our own, individual combat has begun to be practised with success. The Christian horseman, conscious of his power and dexterity in the use of his weapons, will courageously attack the Spahi [Turkish cavalryman], but will probably confide more in the lance than the sabre, which the latter wields with a degree of perfection which we can scarcely hope to attain. The superiority of the Turks in the use of the sabre is founded partly on the quality of the weapon itself, and partly on their (what may be termed) national dexterity in handling it. The Turkish sabre, which is wrought out of fine iron wire, in the hand of one of our powerful labourers, would perhaps break to pieces like glass at the first blow. The Turk, on the contrary, who gives rather a cut than a blow, makes it penetrate through helmet, cuirass, &c., and separates in a moment the head or the limbs from the body. Hence, we seldom hear of slight wounds in an action of cavalry with Turks. It is a well-known fact, in the Russian Army, that a colonel, who was in front of his regiment, seeing the Spahis make an unexpected attack upon him, drew his sabre, and was going to command his men to do the same, when, at the first word ‘draw’, his head was severed from his body. But, as Scanderbeg [the 15th-century Albanian chief] said, such a sabre only produces its effect when in the hand of him who knows how to use it. It is related that, at the storming of Ismael [in 1790], a brave [English] foreigner who served as a volunteer in the Russian Army, and who was most actively engaged in the mêlée, broke in pieces several Turkish sabres and constantly armed himself with a fresh one taken from the Turks who were slain.” (Baron von Valentini, Military Reflections on Turkey, 1828.)
普鲁士军队的瓦伦蒂尼少将：“在古代，骑士的剑和骑枪被证实能够强力压制萨拉逊人的军刀，即使是我们自己，也发现训练这些对单兵作战卓有成效。基督徒骑手，对运用他们武器的力量和技巧富于自信，会英勇地进攻西帕希（土耳其骑兵），但他们可能更信赖骑枪而非军刀，因为运用军刀需要我们几乎无法达到的完美程度。土耳其人运用军刀的优势，一部分在于武器品质本身，一部分在于他们的（可能被称之为）民族武艺。土耳其军刀，由优质铁丝锻造而成，如果拿给我们强壮的劳工们用，可能一击就会像玻璃一样断成几截。而土耳其人则与之相反，他们运用切砍而非挥击，连头盔和胸甲都能砍透，并在一瞬之间分离你的头颅和四肢。因此，我们很少听闻在对土耳其人的骑兵行动中有人轻伤。还有一个众所周知的事实，在俄罗斯军队中，有一名上校，在他的团前方时发现了西帕希骑兵的突袭，他拔出军刀，准备命令他的军队也这么做。当他刚喊出第一个字‘拔...’的时候，已经头身分离。不过，如同斯坎德贝格（15世纪阿尔巴尼亚酋长，抗击过土耳其入侵）所说，此种军刀仅仅只有在熟知其用法的人手中才能发挥效用，这又联想到一件事，在伊斯梅尔动荡期间，一名英国勇士作为志愿兵加入了俄国军队，他活跃于各种混战之中，打断过好几把土耳其军刀，又从他手刃之人的尸体上捡来新的。”
(Baron von Valentini, Military Reflections on Turkey, 1828.)
“The sharpness of the edge of the Turkish sabre, and the velocity which the arm gives to a light weapon, compensates for the weight of the sabre. All their attention has been paid to the sabre for ages (with it they conquered their empire), and it certainly deserves some attention for cavalry. The edge of our sabres is never sharp enough, and the angle of the edge is too acute. In regard to its [the Turkish sabre’s] crookedness, it has an advantage, as a blow straight down gives a drawing cut; and it is a good defence; for the arm being held out horizontally with the sabre upright in the hand, a small motion of the wrist, turning the edge to the right or left, covers the body by the crook of the sabre; the shoulder of the edge, not the edge itself, forms the parry. [Additional evidence refuting the assertion that using the edge rather than the point makes one more vulnerable.] The push with the sabre is also a good attack. If, however, the push only is preferred for cavalry, the lighter and longer the sabre is the better, and the nearer it is to a spear or lance. The blow upwards is esteemed the most dangerous by the Turks, as it is the most difficult to parry.
土耳其军刀刃口的锋利度，以及手臂给武器的加速度，能弥补其较轻的重量。他们在四处征伐打造帝国的漫长岁月中专注于军刀，而这的确很适合骑兵。我们军刀总是不够锋利，而且刃角too acute，而土耳其军刀的曲度也有其优势，在直下的劈砍中会形成拖砍；也有很好的防御效果；因为手臂水平伸出，军刀垂直于手掌时，一个手腕的小动作就能左右变换刀刃方向，利用曲度护住身体；刃的肩部（？），而非刃本身，用于格挡。【附加证据驳斥运用刀刃比运用刀尖更容易受攻击的说法（up：也可能是说砍比刺更容易受攻击的说法）】土耳其军刀用于推刺（推进？）也很不错。如果骑兵更喜欢推刺的话，更轻更长的军刀显然更好，使其接近于矛或者骑枪。上升斩击是土耳其人最危险的招式，因为这招非常难以格挡。
“Many of their cavalry make use of the spear, which, for a close regular front, is perhaps the best weapon; but as the Turkish horse wheel round in full speed, and are never in a regular straight line, perhaps no weapon is so advantageous as their light, sharp, crooked sabre. No body of cavalry that keeps together and makes its evolutions without being broken (that is, keeping a close front in a line) can give a shock to the Turkish cavalry; they wheel about and retreat much faster than regular cavalry can advance; and this not in a body, but each man turns his horse round in his place. Their cavalry is generally superior to all the cavalry they have been opposed to hitherto. [Eton might have said the same of the Sikhs, Marathas, and other Asian horsemen.]
他们的骑兵中有很多都用枪矛，当然，在紧密的常规阵列中，这可能是最好的武器。但若像土耳其战马那样全速环绕奔驰，且从不会形成一条常规线列，可能没有什么武器比他们那轻盈，锋利，弯曲的军刀更具优势了。
没有骑兵能够在推进冲击土耳其人时依然能够保持线列紧密，阵型不破。土耳其人转圈和撤退都比普通骑兵更迅速；这并非一两个人的行为，而是全员都在策马环行，这些骑兵比他们迄今为止对付过的所有骑兵都要出色。【伊顿可能会说锡克人，马拉地人（印度中西部），和一些其他亚洲骑手也是如此。】
(A Survey of the Turkish Empire, 1798.)
“Their best Turkish sabres have one great defect: brittleness; they are apt to fly like glass by a blow given injudiciously, though a person used to cut with them will, without any danger of breaking a sabre or turning its edge, cut through an iron nail as thick as a man’s finger. Few accidents happen in consequence of sabres breaking among the Turkish cavalry, but very frequently amongst the infantry, from ignorance of their use。(A Survey of the Turkish Empire, 1798.）
即使最好的土耳其军刀都存在一个很大的缺陷：脆性；很容易就会在一次毛躁的挥击中像玻璃一样断开。但若思维清晰地发动切砍，则不会有任何打裂刀刃或损伤刃口的风险，而且连手指粗的铁钉都能切开。土耳其骑兵中少有打断军刀的事故，但在步兵中却非常常见，这是由于他们对其运用技巧的无知。
英国骑兵、印度骑兵 vs 僧格林沁的蒙古骑兵 （八里桥之战，第二次**战争，1860年）
“The Tartar cavalry, although physically fine-enough men, and by no means wanting in pluck, are wretchedly mounted on meagre-looking ponies and still-worse armed; their only weapons being clumsy and notvery-sharp lances, still more clumsy and blunter swords, matchlocks or old-fashioned pistols, nearly harmless to all but their owners, and bows and arrows. They must have lost at least three or four hundred killed and wounded during the day; whereas our casualties amounted to only twentyfive.” (Letter of a Royal Marine officer, “Occasional Papers of the Nautical Club,” The Nautical Magazine, Vol. 29, 1860.) The official British loss was 2 killed and 29 wounded, plus 28 horses killed and missing; and the estimated total enemy loss for the day was about 500 killed and an unknown number of wounded.
鞑靼骑兵，尽管身体素质不错，也绝不缺乏勇气。但却骑在外形瘦弱的矮种马上，带着低劣的装备。他们仅有的武器是笨拙且不太锋利的骑枪，更为笨重且钝的刀剑，火绳枪或老式手枪，几乎只能伤害到使用者自己，还有弓和箭。那一天他们至少留下了三四百的死伤人员（Up：应该指一整天而非一次骑兵冲锋的死伤），而我们的伤亡仅仅二十五。(Letter of a Royal Marine officer, “Occasional Papers of the Nautical Club,” The Nautical Magazine, Vol. 29, 1860.)
英国官方统计记录是2死，29伤，28匹马死亡或失踪，估计那天敌人有大约500人死亡，未知数量的人员受伤。
Reverend R. J. L. M’Ghee, chaplain to the expeditionary force, regarding the action: “Down they [the Tartars] went like ninepins as our long-armed ‘heavies’ gave them the point; the weight of horse and man carried everything before it. No troops could have done better than they did, as the ghastly spectacle proved to those who saw it at the time. One poor fellow with the back of his head clean cut off; another cleft from the shoulder, halfway down the chest; the next run right through and through, from shoulder to chest, as he fled, caught by the superior stride of the hi***red troop horse; another with a frightful flesh wound in the arm. You turn away in disgust; but what can you say? The Tartar fights as a savage; and if you don’t kill him, he will kill you. A staff officer told me that he had counted 140 Tartars on the ground; a very large number when you recollect that we had but a handful of dragoons [945 against “some 3,000 at least”], and that the Tartars bolted as soon as they discovered what stuff the British soldier is made of.” (How We Got to Pekin, 1862.)
远征军随军牧师R. J. L. M’Ghee，提及这次行动：“当我们的long-armed ‘heavies’ 刺向这些鞑靼人，他们像九柱戏（保龄球前身）一样倒下。他们（指这些英国骑兵）把人和马的重量都压在前面。没有任何骑兵能做得比他们更好，这种惨烈的景象证明了这一点。一个可怜的家伙被一记干净的斩击切开后脑勺，另一个人肩膀裂开，快要深及胸腔。当他逃跑时，一名骑着纯血马的骑兵大步截住了他，接下来的一击从肩膀彻底透入前胸；另一个人手臂上布满了可怕的伤口。看见这种场面，你可能会恶心得别过头去，但你又能怎么说？鞑靼人像野人一样战斗，你不杀他，死的就是你。一名参谋告诉我他在战场上数出了140名鞑靼人的尸体。这是一个很大的数字，如果你想到我们只有少量龙骑兵。{945人对抗至少3000人}当鞑靼人发现英国士兵是什么样的硬茬，就尽快溜走了。”
Captain J. H. Dunne, 99th Regiment: “Never before saw so much slaughter for a charge. The ground was strewed with dead, most of them with frightful sabre cuts.” (From Calcutta to Pekin, 1861.)
The King’s Dragoon Guards, numbering 185, were supported by two regiments of Indian irregulars—Fane’s Horse (327) and Probyn’s Horse (433)—and officially, the dragoons killed about 200 and the irregulars about 150.
第99军团的 J. H. Dunne上尉：“从未在哪次冲锋中见过如此惨烈的屠杀。地上到处都是尸体，大多数身上都带着可怕的刀伤。” (From Calcutta to Pekin, 1861.)
禁卫龙骑兵185人，受到两个印度非正规军团的支援——费恩骑兵团（327人）和普罗比骑兵团（433人）——官方说法，龙骑兵杀死大约200人，非正规军团杀死大约150人。
Lieutenant C. M. MacGregor, Fane’s Horse: “I was much struck with the coolness of the Tartars; they behaved with considerable pluck at first; and when they did run, though they went as fast as they could, they stopped every now and then and fired, taking considerable care in their aim. Their swords are useless, mere pieces of iron, and so blunt that though I got a fair cut over the head, it did not even cut my turban. In appearance they are very fine men, and only want good training to make excellent soldiers.” (Lady MacGregor, The Life and Opinions of Major-General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, 1888.)
费恩骑兵团（印度）C. M. MacGregor中尉：“我震惊于鞑靼人的冷静，他们起初表现得相当勇敢；当他们逃离时，尽管全速奔驰，也会不时停下来开火，而且还会留心准头。他们的刀剑没什么用，仅仅是些铁块，钝得即使朝我头部结结实实来了一刀，却连我的Turban头巾都没砍开（Up：某些印度头巾很大一坨....）。从外形上看，他们都是很不错的兵员，只是需要良好的训练打造成杰出的士兵。”(Lady MacGregor, The Life and Opinions of Major-General Sir Charles Metcalfe MacGregor, 1888.)
Another theme which we see repeatedly occurring in these accounts is the contrast between top-quality troops and enemies who were either of lesser quality, poorly equipped, or simply not so experienced. The contrast between the performance of the veteran British cavalry forces in China in 1860 and their Tartar foes is stark; but it must be recalled that the British and Indian cavalry in 1860 were amongst the most experienced in the world at the time, having come out of a quick succession of wars which had seen heavy hand-to-hand fighting, including the Anglo-Sikh Wars, the Crimean War, and the Indian Mutiny. In some cases we can even see that a force which shows a poor level of effectiveness at one period of history may have attained a much greater level of experience and ability a decade later. Certainly the general impression is that British forces were more effective after being posted to places like India for a while, even sometimes resulting in obvious improvements in equipment, uniform, and tactics.
在Matt Easton为不列颠尼亚剑客所写的序中特意提到以上记录。
我们在这些记录中反复看到的另一个主题是，一个国家的顶级军队和敌人较低级军队之间的对比，这些敌人质量较低，装备简陋，或者就是简单的经验不足。1860年资深英国骑兵在中国的表现与其鞑靼敌人形成鲜明对比;但必须指出的是，1860年的英国骑兵和印度骑兵是当时世界上最富有经验的骑兵，他们经历了一系列激烈的肉搏战，包括英国-锡克战争、克里米亚战争和印度兵变。在某些情况下，我们甚至可以看到，一支在某一个历史时期表现较差的部队可能在十年后就获得了更大的经验和能力。事实上总的印象是英军在被派往像印度这样的地方一段时间后会变得更有效率，甚至有时会在装备、制服和战术上都有明显的改进。
